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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Too often the silence of contracting parties must be 
filled by the voice of the courts.  Such is the case here, where 
we are called upon to resolve a trademark dispute in which no 
written contract designates ownership, and, in the process, to 
clarify the paradigm through which common law ownership 
of an unregistered trademark is determined when the initial 
sale of goods bearing the mark is between a manufacturer and 
its exclusive distributor.  The District Court in this case 
awarded ownership to the manufacturer, but did so on the 
basis of the first use test, and found the distributor liable for 
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infringement and fraud before rejecting its defense of 
acquiescence and awarding damages under the Lanham Act.  
Because the District Court failed to recognize and apply the 
rebuttable presumption of manufacturer ownership that we 
conclude pertains where priority of ownership is not 
otherwise established, and because the District Court 
incorrectly relied on gross sales unadjusted to reflect sales of 
infringing products to calculate damages, we will affirm on 
alternative grounds as to ownership, will affirm as to fraud 
and acquiescence, and will vacate and remand as to damages.  
I.   Factual Background and Procedural History 
 Covertech Fabricating, Inc. is a manufacturer of 
protective packaging and reflective insulation located in 
Toronto, Canada.  Since 1998, it has sold numerous reflective 
insulation products under the umbrella of its lucrative rFOIL 
brand—a United States trademark that has been registered in 
Covertech’s name since 2001.  The rFOIL brand comprises 
the following products: ULTRA NT RADIANT BARRIER 
(“ULTRA”), NT RADIANT BARRIER, CONCRETE 
BARRIER FOIL, CONCRETE UNDERPAD, and ULTRA 
CONCRETE UNDERPAD.  CONCRETE BARRIER, like 
the umbrella rFOIL brand, is a registered United States 
trademark.   
 TVM Building Products, Inc. is a distributor of 
specialty building materials operating out of Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the President of TVM, Michael 
Boulding, and the owner and President of Covertech, Furio 
Orologio, entered into a verbal agreement (the “exclusive 
distribution agreement”), which designated TVM as the 
exclusive marketer and distributor of Covertech’s rFOIL 
insulation products in the United States.  Under the terms of 
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the exclusive distribution agreement, Covertech sold its 
rFOIL products directly to TVM for resale to customers in the 
United States at a markup; in turn, TVM refrained from 
selling competitor products in the United States.  TVM held 
exclusive responsibility for customer service and marketing 
of Covertech products in the United States, and while 
Covertech reviewed and approved advertising materials 
designed by TVM, it otherwise played no role in marketing, 
sales, or customer service.   
 In October 2007, Covertech terminated the exclusive 
distribution agreement, both because TVM was consistently 
struggling to remit timely payment and because Covertech 
discovered TVM had been purchasing comparable product 
from another manufacturer, Reflectix, and passing off some 
of its merchandise as Covertech’s.  At the time, TVM assured 
Covertech that its labeling indiscretions were isolated 
incidents caused by errors in filling its orders.  In late 2007 or 
early 2008, the parties entered a new agreement (the “private 
label agreement”) pursuant to which Covertech manufactured 
products for TVM to sell under its own TVM brand name, 
and Covertech also continued to sell certain rFOIL products 
to TVM for resale to customers using Covertech’s product 
names.  Under this agreement, TVM represented that it would 
refrain from buying products from Covertech’s competitors.   
Despite TVM’s promise, it purchased over $2.2 
million in reflective insulation products from Reflectix 
between 2006 and 2009, and in 2009 it began to purchase 
comparable goods from another competitor, Soprema.  In late 
2010 or early 2011, shortly after Covertech learned of TVM’s 
illicit purchases, the parties terminated their relationship 
entirely, including the private label agreement, and Covertech 
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proceeded to sell its own products directly in the United 
States.    
Nonetheless, TVM, without authorization from or 
consultation with Covertech, continued to market its 
reflective insulation products using the rFOIL brand names.  
For example, in 2011, TVM advertised using the 
CONCRETE BARRIER, CONCRETE UNDERPAD, and 
ULTRA CONCRETE UNDERPAD brands in its own 
product catalog, and between 2009 and 2013, TVM marketed 
non-Covertech products on its website using the rFOIL, 
CONCRETE BARRIER, CONCRETE UNDERPAD, and 
ULTRA CONCRETE UNDERPAD labels.  At no point did 
Covertech give TVM permission to sell merchandise using 
these product names, and on multiple occasions when 
Covertech was alerted to particular instances of such 
unauthorized sales during this period, Covertech confronted 
TVM in phone calls and demanded that it discontinue this 
practice.   
 Over the years that Covertech engaged TVM as its 
distributor and made efforts, short of court action, to persuade 
TVM to stop using rFOIL brand names in its advertising, 
Covertech also took steps to protect its ownership of the mark 
in Canada and the United States.  Specifically, in 2009, 
Covertech filed a petition to register ULTRA as a trademark 
with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (“CIPO”), 
which registered the mark in 2010.  The next year, although 
Covertech had informed TVM of its registration in Canada, 
TVM—without notice to or permission from Covertech—
petitioned the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) to register ULTRA as a trademark in its name.  Once 
it learned that the PTO granted that petition, Covertech filed 
an adverse petition with the PTO seeking registration of 
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ULTRA in its own name and filed the lawsuit in federal court 
against TVM that gives rise to this appeal.1   
After a one-week bench trial, the District Court 
granted judgment in favor of Covertech on all claims and, as 
relevant to this appeal, calculated TVM’s ill-gained profits of 
$4,054,319 and alternative statutory damages of $4 million 
for TVM’s infringement of the rFOIL and CONCRETE 
BARRIER marks.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), (c).  Because 
Covertech elected to receive the profit calculation, judgment 
in its favor was awarded in that amount for the infringement 
of those marks.  The District Court subsequently denied 
TVM’s omnibus motion for amended and additional findings, 
altered and amended judgment, and a new trial, and awarded 
Covertech attorneys’ fees and expenses.  This appeal 
followed.   
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1367, and we have jurisdiction 
                                              
1 The original action, which was filed in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, also named TVM Canada, Inc., but 
Covertech later stipulated to dismissal of TVM Canada, Inc. 
and to the transfer of the action to the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  The PTO has stayed the adverse petition 
proceeding pending resolution of the federal court litigation.   
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  We review a district court’s 
factual findings following a bench trial for clear error, 
affording “due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge 
the witnesses’ credibility.”  Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. 
Co., 691 F.3d 500, 514-15 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 52(a)(6)); see also United States v. Mallory, 765 F.3d 
373, 381-82 (3d Cir. 2014).  In contrast, we review 
conclusions of law, including “choice and interpretation of 
legal precepts,” de novo, Post, 691 F.3d at 515, and an award 
of profits under the Lanham Act for abuse of discretion, see 
Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
III. Discussion 
 TVM raises four issues on appeal.  First, it contends 
that the District Court erred in determining that Covertech, 
not TVM, is the owner of the ULTRA trademark.  Second, 
TVM challenges the District Court’s holding that TVM 
committed fraud on the PTO in applying to register the 
ULTRA trademark in its name.  Third, TVM asserts that the 
District Court erred in rejecting TVM’s affirmative defenses 
of acquiescence and laches.  Finally, TVM argues that the 
                                              
2 We reject Covertech’s suggestion that TVM lacks 
standing due to the sale of TVM’s assets to a secured creditor 
after entry of final judgment by the District Court.  
Regardless of whether TVM would benefit from reversal of 
the District Court’s cancellation of the ULTRA mark, TVM 
retains liability for damages from its infringement of that 
mark and hence continues to hold a live interest in this 
controversy.  See generally Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. 
Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
8 
 
District Court abused its discretion in awarding $4,054,319 in 
damages to Covertech for TVM’s infringement of the 
CONCRETE BARRIER and rFOIL marks.  We address these 
issues in turn. 
 A.   Ownership  
 In assessing the rightful ownership of the ULTRA 
mark, the District Court relied on the “first use test,” which 
determines initial ownership by asking which party was the 
first to use an unregistered trademark in commerce.  See 
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 
(1918); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 
F.2d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 1991).  The District Court applied that 
test to the record developed over five days of trial to conclude 
that Covertech was the rightful owner.  For the reasons 
below, we conclude (1) the first use test was not the correct 
test given the unique context of the manufacturer-distributor 
relationship, and (2) the District Court should nonetheless be 
affirmed because ownership still goes to Covertech when the 
correct test is applied.   
1. The First Use Test v. The McCarthy 
Test 
The first use test is generally proper for unregistered 
trademarks, taking account of the well-established common 
law principle of “first-in-time, first-in-right” that rewards 
actual and continuous use in commerce as between market 
competitors.  See Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292; 2 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair 
Competition § 16.1 (4th ed. 2017).  This paradigm is an 
imperfect fit, however, when it comes to the often exclusive 
and noncompetitive manufacturer-distributor relationship, 
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where ownership rights would inure to the benefit of the 
distributor in a multitude of cases based simply on the fact 
that the distributor, albeit at the manufacturer’s direction, 
made the initial sale of goods bearing the mark to the public. 
In contrast to a single actor’s entry into the market, 
manufacturers and distributors typically engage in concerted 
action and thus may, at the outset of the relationship, make 
any number of arrangements for the handling of the mark.  In 
some cases, the parties’ distribution agreement may make 
express provision for ownership of the mark in either party.  
See Premier Dental Prod. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 
794 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1986).  In other cases, there may 
be an express assignment of ownership—that is, the sale of a 
mark—passing the assignor’s rights in the mark to the 
assignee.  See Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 
F.3d 812, 821-22 (3d Cir. 2006); 2 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 18:1.  In still other manufacturer-distributor relationships, 
the contracting parties may omit to make explicit provision 
for ownership of a mark, but even so, have no expectation 
that a manufacturer, merely by contracting with a distributor, 
thereby relinquishes its ownership rights in favor of the 
distributor.  To presume that in every case where ownership is 
not decided in advance, a distributor who makes the initial 
public sale thereby assumes the mark and the manufacturer 
cedes any claim to initial ownership would defy logic and 
common sense.  Thus, it cannot be that, in the absence of a 
contractual arrangement, the first use test automatically fills 
that gap.  Instead, a different test accounting for the realities 
of the manufacturer-distributor relationship must control.   
For that reason, when we first considered the 
manufacturer-distributor domain in Doebler, we cited 
approvingly the ownership test expounded by Professor J. 
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Thomas McCarthy in his seminal treatise on trademark law.  
Doebler, 442 F.3d at 826 (quoting 2 McCarthy on 
Trademarks § 16:48).  But we had no need in Doebler to 
expressly adopt that test because, in that case, initial 
ownership as between the manufacturer and distributor was 
clearly established.  Id. at 826-27.  Today, the issue is 
squarely presented to us, and we find the McCarthy test has 
much to recommend it. 
As Professor McCarthy explains, where initial 
ownership between a manufacturer and its exclusive 
distributor is at issue and no contract exists, the manufacturer 
is the presumptive trademark owner unless the distributor 
rebuts that presumption using a multi-factor balancing test 
designed to examine the distribution agreement in effect 
between the parties.  2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 16.48; see 
also 5 McCarthy on Trademarks § 29.8.  The six factors that 
should be considered are: (1) “[w]hich party invented or 
created the mark”; (2) “[w]hich party first affixed the mark to 
goods sold”; (3) “[w]hich party’s name appeared on 
packaging and promotional materials in conjunction with the 
mark”; (4) “[w]hich party exercised control over the nature 
and quality of goods on which the mark appeared”; (5) “[t]o 
which party did customers look as standing behind the goods, 
e.g., which party received complaints for defects and made 
appropriate replacement or refund”; and (6) “[w]hich party 
paid for advertising and promotion of the trademarked 
product.”  Doebler, 442 F.3d at 826 (quoting 2 McCarthy on 
Trademarks § 16:48). 
The presumption and rebuttal factors of the McCarthy 
test place a thumb on the ownership scale in favor of the 
manufacturer, but invite courts to consider various indicia of 
ownership designed to elicit the roles and responsibilities of 
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the parties and the expectations of consumers in order to 
gauge whether, in a given case, the distributor and not the 
manufacturer operated as the rightful owner of the contested 
mark.  Thus, unlike the first use test, this approach allows 
courts to undertake a thorough, individualized analysis of 
each case that accounts for the unique attributes of the 
manufacturer-distributor relationship.   
We are persuaded by Professor McCarthy’s approach, 
and hold today that as between a manufacturer and its 
exclusive distributor, there is a rebuttable presumption of 
initial trademark ownership in favor of the manufacturer, and 
that Professor McCarthy’s test is the proper analytical tool 
through which a distributor may attempt to rebut that 
presumption in the absence of a contractual agreement.   
Our adoption of this test is also consistent with our 
sister Circuits, which, when asked to determine ownership in 
this context, have endorsed some version of the McCarthy 
test, see TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 
876, 884 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997); Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC 
Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996), as have a 
number of district courts, see, e.g., Prod. Source Int’l, LLC v. 
Nahshin, 112 F. Supp. 3d 383, 395-97 (E.D. Va. 2015); 
Tecnimed SRL v. Kidz-Med, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 395, 403 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 462 F. App’x 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Ilapak Research & Dev. S.A. v. Record SpA., 762 F. Supp. 
1318, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1991).  While some courts have distilled 
Professor McCarthy’s six factors to four, see Sengoku, 96 
F.3d at 1220; Tecnimed, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 403, and others 
have varied the language, see, e.g., Ilapak, 762 F. Supp. at 
1322, all have cited either to Professor McCarthy’s treatise 
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itself or to cases that do so, applying the McCarthy test with 
only minor variations across the federal courts.3   
Despite its general acceptance and although our own 
adoption of it today was presaged by Doebler, the McCarthy 
test is absent from the District Court’s analysis of the ULTRA 
mark in this case.  Nor, apparently, did the parties recognize 
its relevance, as it garnered nary a mention in their briefing 
before the District Court or on appeal.  Instead, the District 
Court and the parties relied on Premier Dental Products. Co. 
v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1986), 
where we counseled consideration of a product’s goodwill 
before finding that ownership has vested in a distributor, even 
when the manufacturer has expressly assigned title to the 
mark.  See id. at 853-54.  In Doebler, however, we cabined 
Premier to only those cases involving express assignment of a 
mark.  Doebler, 442 F.3d at 826-27 & n.16.  Yet the case 
before us, all parties agree, falls outside that category.   
After we asked the parties to address Doebler in 
supplemental submissions and at argument, TVM conceded 
the District Court’s error and the applicability of the 
McCarthy test and urged that it should prevail when that test 
is applied; Covertech, however, sought to defend the District 
Court’s decision in its favor, including the District Court’s 
                                              
3 In reducing McCarthy’s six factors to four, the Ninth 
Circuit in Sengoku combined as one factor the first and 
second factors—asking “which party invented and first 
affixed the mark onto the product”—and omitted the sixth 
factor, which party paid for marketing.  See Sengoku, 96 F.3d 
at 1220.  We conclude, however, that district courts’ analysis 
and appellate review will be facilitated by considering each of 
these factors distinctly. 
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application of the first use test.4  In support, though, 
Covertech merely directed us to Ford Motor Co., our case 
adopting the first use test, without explaining why that test, 
rather than the McCarthy test, should apply here.  See Ford 
Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292.   
We conclude the District Court’s application of the 
first use test was legal error.  To the extent there was any 
ambiguity after Doebler, we resolve it today: In the absence 
of a contractual arrangement or assignment, the McCarthy 
test is the proper test to apply to determine ownership in the 
manufacturer-distributor context.   
 2. Applying The McCarthy Test 
Where a district court has applied the incorrect legal 
test to make the ruling under review, we may remand for that 
court to apply the right test in the first instance.  See, e.g., 
Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 
(3d Cir. 2010).  Here, however, the six factors of the 
McCarthy test are fully briefed, the parties have confirmed 
that they would not add to the record on remand, and our 
application of the test may provide helpful guidance to district 
courts.  We therefore proceed to apply the test ourselves, 
                                              
4 Covertech also contends that we should not 
determine the applicability of the McCarthy test in this case 
given TVM’s failure to raise it before the District Court and 
in its opening brief on appeal.  We disagree.  Notwithstanding 
TVM’s waiver, it is necessary and appropriate for us to take 
up the question of the proper legal test because it is a purely 
legal question, the resolution of which is in the public 
interest.  See Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74-75 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
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evaluating each of the six factors and concluding that, on 
balance, they favor Covertech.  See Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 
837 F.3d 356, 374-75 (3d Cir. 2016).   
First, we query which party invented or created the 
mark.  Although it did so in the context of its first use 
analysis, the District Court made a finding that “Covertech 
developed and used the ULTRA . . . brand.”  App. 11.  We 
review that finding for clear error, and see none.  See Post, 
691 F.3d at 514.  The District Court’s finding is supported by 
the testimony of Covertech’s Vice President, Jonathan Starr, 
who explained that Covertech developed ULTRA as a 
“heavier-duty product” that “evolved” from its original NT 
RADIANT BARRIER product line.  App. 862, 886, 902.  
Conversely, TVM contends that the testimony of its 
President, Michael Boulding, supports TVM’s invention of 
the mark, i.e., Boulding’s statements that TVM encouraged 
the production of a new insulation product and fashioned the 
ULTRA nomenclature that followed.  But, in doing so, TVM 
ignores the fact that the District Court judged Boulding to be 
incredible.  We will not disturb the District Court’s credibility 
determination—“quintessentially the province of the trial 
court, not the appellate court”—except in “rare 
circumstances,” not present here, Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 
238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2001), such as when “specific 
evidence” exists showing “the Court’s findings were made in 
clear error,” Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Pension, Health 
Benefit & Educ. Fund, v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, far from 
rebutting Covertech’s ownership, this factor supports it.   
Second, regarding which party first affixed the mark to 
the goods sold, although TVM asserts that “[t]he record does 
not adequately reflect the labeling of the ULTRA . . . product 
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prior to the expiration of the exclusivity agreement,” 
Appellant’s Suppl. Br. 4, the record unequivocally 
demonstrates that labeling was handled by Covertech.  Peter 
Clarke, a sales representative of Covertech and a former 
employee of TVM, testified that during the period of the 
exclusive distribution agreement, Covertech factory 
employees used a label chart to guide them when affixing 
labels to manufactured products.  The District Court deemed 
that testimony credible, and we, of course, defer to such 
credibility findings absent clear error.  See Trs. of the Nat’l 
Elevator Indus. Pension, 332 F.3d at 194.  Even Boulding 
conceded that TVM “would provide the artwork to Covertech 
in a form that they could then print the labels in order to 
adhere them to the product.”  App. 1102.  In sum, this factor 
too favors Covertech. 
The third factor, which party’s name appeared on 
packaging and promotional materials in conjunction with the 
mark, is more equivocal.  The record reveals examples of 
promotional materials that display both the Covertech and the 
TVM logos in connection with advertisement of the ULTRA 
mark and associated products, and while TVM’s name is 
consistently larger and more prominently visible, Covertech’s 
is associated with warranties.  Because we are unable to 
discern any relative significance in their manner of display, 
this factor is in equipoise. 
 As to the fourth factor, which party exercised control 
over the nature and quality of the goods on which the mark 
appeared, although there is evidence on both sides, we 
conclude the evidence again tips in Covertech’s favor.  The 
District Court found that Covertech manufactured all products 
contested in this suit, and that TVM fielded complaints and 
supplied technical support to customers, and the parties do 
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not dispute that Covertech bore responsibility for warranties 
and manufactured the ULTRA product.  While Boulding 
offered testimony that TVM monitored and set in motion the 
modification of goods that later became associated with the 
ULTRA mark, we accord little weight to that testimony in 
view of the District Court’s general credibility findings as to 
that witness.  See Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Pension, 
332 F.3d at 194.  TVM’s rebuttal garners no support from this 
factor. 
 TVM fares no better with the fifth factor, i.e., to which 
party did customers look as standing behind the goods—for 
example, which party received complaints for defects and 
made appropriate replacements or refunds.  Although the 
District Court’s findings and the record reflect TVM’s high-
visibility roles in marketing, sales, and fielding customer 
complaints, it is undisputed that Covertech provided the 
warranties for ULTRA products and that this was made plain 
in product advertisements.  In addition, Covertech presented 
customer testimony, found credible by the District Court, that 
reflected the ULTRA products were associated with 
Covertech.  This factor thus supports Covertech’s ownership.     
The sixth and last factor—which party paid for 
advertising and promotion of the trademarked product—as it 
turns out, is the only one that favors TVM.  It is undisputed 
that TVM was responsible for advertising and promoting the 
products for sale in the United States, including ULTRA, and 
the District Court found that TVM “was compensated by 
being the exclusive distributor of the product line and getting 
Covertech’s products at a very good price, which it would 
then mark up for sale in the United States.”  App. 16.  
Although Covertech contends these discounts were 
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tantamount to its own payment and responsibility for 
advertising, that contention finds no support in the record.    
Having reviewed all six factors, we conclude the 
presumption is dispositive, as the weight of the McCarthy 
factors is indisputably in Covertech’s favor.  While a mere 
counting of the factors is not dispositive—the weight of each 
being variable with the facts—the numbers here, as well as 
the weight, favor Covertech.  Factors one, two, four, and five 
are for Covertech; factor three is inconclusive; and factor six 
is for TVM.  Even if the balance was in equilibrium, such a 
result would still be insufficient to overcome Covertech’s 
presumptive ownership of the ULTRA mark.  The District 
Court’s conclusion that Covertech was the rightful owner of 
the mark, albeit under an incorrect test, was thus correct, and 
we will affirm as to that ruling.   
 B.   Fraud on The PTO 
 In addition to ownership of the mark, TVM challenges 
the District Court’s cancellation of TVM’s registration of the 
mark based on a finding of fraud on the PTO, specifically, its 
finding that Boulding made intentional misrepresentations in 
TVM’s application to register the ULTRA trademark and its 
legal conclusion that TVM committed fraud.  These 
challenges lack merit. 
 The Lanham Act provides that a third party may 
petition for cancellation of a registered trademark if the 
registration was procured by fraud, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 
1120, a showing that must be made by clear and convincing 
evidence that the “applicant or registrant knowingly ma[de] a 
false, material representation with the intent to deceive the 
PTO,” In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 
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2009); see Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 196 (3d Cir. 
2001).  That intent to deceive can be inferred from indirect or 
circumstantial evidence, In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1245, 
indicating that “the registrant actually knew or believed that 
someone else had a right to the mark,” Marshak, 240 F.3d at 
196.    
Here, Boulding attested in connection with TVM’s 
petition to register the ULTRA mark that “he believed no 
other person, firm, corporation, or association ha[d] the right 
to use the mark,” a statement he made under penalty of 
perjury.5  App. 1451.  The District Court was entirely 
justified in finding Boulding’s testimony at trial not credible 
and in concluding that, “[i]n light of Mr. Boulding’s prior 
interactions with Covertech, he must have known or believed 
that Covertech had a right to use the mark.”  App. 98-99.  
While Boulding asserted his statement was a mere mistake, 
the District Court astutely observed, first, that TVM was 
aware on the date of its PTO application that Covertech had 
recently registered the ULTRA mark in Canada, and second, 
that Covertech continued to sell ULTRA in the United States 
                                              
 5 The District Court found not only that statement, but 
also two additional statements Boulding made in applying to 
the PTO, to be intentional misrepresentations—(1) “TVM 
first used the mark in 2006” and (2) Boulding “believed that 
TVM was the owner of the mark.”  App. 97.  We need not 
address knowledge or falsity as to these statements because 
we will affirm the District Court’s conclusion as to the 
statement above, which alone supports the conclusion that 
TVM’s registration was fraudulently procured and thus 
should be cancelled. 
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at that time, placing the companies in direct competition.  
Deferring to the District Court’s credibility findings, which 
are fully supported by the record, we perceive no error in the 
District Court’s determination that Boulding subjectively 
intended to deceive the PTO, see In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 
at 1245; Marshak, 240 F.3d at 196, and that TVM obtained 
registration of the ULTRA mark through fraud.  
 C.   Acquiescence 
 We turn next to TVM’s argument that the District 
Court should have found Covertech’s claims barred by the 
doctrines of laches and acquiescence.  We dispose quickly of 
the laches argument, which was raised for the first time on 
appeal and is therefore waived.  TVM’s acquiescence 
argument is preserved for appeal, but is nonetheless 
unavailing.   
 An alleged infringer may assert the equitable defense 
of acquiescence “when the trademark owner, by affirmative 
word or deed, conveys its implied consent” to the use of a 
mark.  Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 
F.3d 800, 804 (3d Cir. 1998).  Relevant considerations, 
required as elements in a number of our sister Circuits, may 
include whether “(1) the senior user actively represented that 
it would not assert a right or a claim; (2) the [senior user’s] 
delay between the active representation and assertion of the 
right or claim was not excusable; and (3) the delay caused the 
defendant undue prejudice.”  Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, 
Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Seller 
Agency Council, Inc. v. Kennedy Ctr. for Real Estate Educ., 
Inc., 621 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2010); ProFitness Physical 
Therapy Ctr. v. Pro-Fit Orthopedic & Sports Physical 
Therapy P.C., 314 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2002); SunAmerica 
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Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 77 F.3d 1325, 1334 
(11th Cir. 1996).  Once use becomes infringing, the relevant 
date for quantifying the “delay” is when the trademark owner 
either knew or should have known of the existence of a 
provable claim of infringement, and an owner’s claim does 
not ripen until the defendant’s infringement is sufficiently far-
reaching to create a likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., What-
A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc. of Corpus Christi, 
Tex., 357 F.3d 441, 449-50 (4th Cir. 2004).   
Here, these considerations lead us to conclude 
Covertech did not acquiesce in TVM’s infringement.  TVM 
has not identified any affirmative statement or act on the part 
of Covertech that expressly or impliedly authorized TVM’s 
infringement, nor has it shown that Covertech’s delay in 
initiating suit was either inexcusable or unduly prejudicial.  
See Hyson, 821 F.3d at 941; Pappan, 143 F.3d at 804.  
Although Covertech learned on at least three occasions in 
2007 and 2008 that TVM was passing off other 
manufacturer’s goods under its brand names, TVM led it to 
believe these incidents were isolated and merely accidental, 
and Covertech did not discover until late 2010 or early 
2011—in a deposition for an unrelated matter—the true 
magnitude of TVM’s infringement.  Only then did the 
acquiescence clock start to run, and Covertech’s escalating 
responses from that point forward appear both reasonable and 
timely.  That is, having discovered TVM’s actual 
infringement, Starr called Boulding on multiple occasions 
between 2010 and 2013 to demand that TVM “stop using . . . 
[Covertech’s] brand names.”  App. 935.  And when those 
efforts failed to yield results, Covertech commenced this 
litigation in May 2013.  On that record, we perceive no 
factual or legal error in the District Court’s conclusion that 
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Covertech’s delay in initiating suit did not demonstrate 
implied consent.  See Pappan, 143 F.3d at 804. 
 D.   Damages 
 In its final argument on appeal, TVM submits that the 
District Court abused its discretion in awarding to Covertech 
$4,054,319 of TVM’s profits for TVM’s infringement of the 
rFOIL and CONCRETE BARRIER trademarks because, in 
the absence of any evidence in the record of TVM’s actual 
profits for sales of infringing products, the District Court 
based its calculation on TVM’s total sales in the metal 
building industry.  That is, rather than awarding $4 million in 
statutory damages, the District Court relied on evidence of 
TVM’s gross sales between 2009 and 2013 and then 
spontaneously reduced this figure by 30% to avoid an 
excessive award.  If the finding of infringement is upheld on 
appeal, TVM contends the proper award would be statutory 
damages.6  We agree.   
 The Lanham Act provides two alternatives for 
calculating damages: either an award subject to principles of 
equity that turns on evidence of the defendant’s sales and 
profits, see 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), or, alternatively, statutory 
damages of between $1,000 and $2 million per counterfeit 
mark for each type of good or service offered for sale or 
distributed, as the court considers just, see id. § 1117(c).  The 
choice between these awards is at the plaintiff’s election, and 
                                              
6 While in briefing, TVM appeared to assert error in 
the District Court’s calculation of both actual and statutory 
damages, at oral argument, it clarified that it contests only 
actual damages, not the District Court’s alternative 
calculation of $4 million in statutory damages.   
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the district court enjoys wide discretion in applying equitable 
principles.  See id.; Banjo Buddies, 399 F.3d at 177.  But, in 
particular where a district court is making an estimate of 
actual profits under the first alternative, its discretion must be 
within boundaries, and the touchstone is reasonableness.  
Those boundaries were tested here and, we conclude, were 
crossed when the District Court calculated damages by using 
industry-wide gross sales figures and by selecting a random 
discount value to determine—in the absence of, for example, 
company records, expert testimony, or other record 
evidence—that profits approximated 70% of gross sales of all 
industry products.   
 Covertech, relying on our decision in Banjo Buddies v. 
Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2005), contends the District 
Court’s calculation was within its discretion in view of the 
Lanham Act’s burden-shifting framework for an equitable 
award of actual damages.  Under that framework, the 
trademark owner is tasked with proving the infringer’s sales 
before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show 
costs and deductions.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  Covertech’s 
argument seems to be that if a plaintiff makes a showing of 
gross sales—even industry-wide sales, not limited to the 
infringing product—and a defendant then fails to offer a 
rebuttal, it is within the district court’s discretion to award as 
“actual profits” any dollar amount up to 100% of those gross 
sales.  Covertech is mistaken. 
A district court’s discretion, wide as it may be, is not 
unbounded, and a bare showing of gross sales is not sufficient 
to fashion an equitable award without some anchor in the 
record to support a reasonable estimation of actual profits.  
Indeed, Covertech’s approach would render equitable 
considerations—and by extension, our review for abuse of 
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discretion—a nullity.  We will not interpret the Lanham Act’s 
statutory burden-shifting mechanism in such a nonsensical 
manner.  See In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 
330 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Nor does our case law go so far.  In Banjo Buddies, 
while we explained that a district court has broad discretion to 
fashion remedies where a defendant fails to meet its burden of 
proof regarding costs and damages, we affirmed the district 
court’s decision to rely sua sponte on testimony of the 
defendant’s business manager to estimate profits.  399 F.3d at 
177.  Further, in Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass 
Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008), and WMS Gaming 
Inc. v. WPC Productions Ltd., 542 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2008), 
although the respective defendants offered no evidence to 
mitigate the plaintiffs’ showing of gross sales, those Courts of 
Appeals held that the damages requested were reasonable 
because, in each case, gross sales were tied directly to total 
profits resulting from infringement and the damages sought 
were only a small proportion of that amount.  Venture Tape, 
540 F.3d at 64; WMS Gaming, 542 F.3d at 604, 609.   
As these cases make clear, where a district court 
endeavors to calculate damages under the Lanham Act on the 
basis of the defendant’s actual profits, rather than awarding 
statutory damages, it must ground its estimate in the record—
e.g., business records, credible witness testimony, expert 
testimony, or industry data—in order to pass muster as a 
reasonable estimate and an appropriate exercise of discretion.  
Conversely, where the court lacks a sound basis for 
extrapolating actual profits, it abuses its discretion by 
resorting to guesswork.  For just such situations, the Lanham 
Act provides for statutory damages in the alternative, and it is 
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on that provision that the court must rely.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(c).   
Here, the District Court eschewed statutory damages 
and awarded $4,054,319 as a matter of equitable discretion 
even though the record was insufficient to approximate actual 
damages.  For the reasons we have explained, that award 
constituted an abuse of discretion and cannot stand.  As 
Covertech has requested the opportunity on remand to elect 
an award of statutory damages, see, e.g., Cotter v. Christus 
Gardens, Inc., No. 99-5996, 2000 WL 187698, at *6 (6th Cir. 
Dec. 12, 2000); Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 
1983) (per curiam), we will vacate and remand with 
instructions to the District Court to grant that request.     
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
will vacate and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
